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INSURANCE
By

MAXIMILIAN

A. POCK*

Again, as last year, the most important contribution to the law of insurance was not made by courts but by the legislature. Fourteen enactments
attest to the prolificacy of the General Assembly, and of these, one promises to put Georgia in the forefront of the nation-wide movement to modernize and restructure the delivery system for lawyers' services-it is a
comprehensive and well thought-out piece of legislation for the organization and policing of flexible prepaid legal services plans.
Of the 45 appellate cases decided during this survey period, only two
involved issues of first impression, and only 28 warrant comment at this
time. To provide continuity they will be discussed in accordance with the
basic outline and subject matter headings employed in past years. Where
certiorari has been denied or applied for but not disposed of during the
survey period, this will be so indicated in the footnotes.
I.

AGENTS AND BROKERS LIABILITY TO INSURED

In Wright Body Works, Inc. v. Columbus Interstate InsuranceAgency,
the supreme court clarified the liability of intermediaries in the marketing
of insurance and cut through some of the distortions caused by the misleading use of agency classifications. The insured contacted an insurance
brokerage corporation and asked it to obtain a sufficient amount of business interruption insurance. The broker examined the insured's business
records and procured two policies from different firms. These policies,
although made available to the insured, were admittedly never examined
by him. At the end of the two fiscal years subsequent to the issuance of
the policies the insured provided the broker with additional audits to assure full coverage, but the broker initiated no modifications of the policies.
When an insured fire loss occurred nearly three years after issuance of the
policies it was discovered that the broker, while properly examining the
annual audits to review coverage requirements, had negligently misread
the policies and erroneously determined the amount of insurance needed
to assure full coverage based on "gross profit" rather than "gross earnings"
as specifically demanded by the policies. The resulting miscalculation had
resulted in substantial underinsurance.
Is the broker liable to the insured in such circumstances? The supreme
court answered this question in the affirmative and rejected the mechanistic rule that in every case where an insurance policy is issued and the
insured is furnished with a copy of such policy he is charged with knowl* Professor of Law, George Washington University National Law Center. University of
Iowa (J.D., 1958); University of Michigan Law School (S.J.D., 1962). Member of the State
Bar of Georgia.
1. 233 Ga. 268, 210 S.E.2d 801 (1974).
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edge of its contents and no recovery can ever be had if the policy does not
in fact provide the coverage contracted for. The ambit of this rule is at
best limited to situations where the discrepancy between the policy and
the coverage contracted for is readily apparent upon perusal and where the
intermediary acts solely as an agent for the insurer throughout the entire
transaction.
In the present case the insured had a contract with a broker obligating
the latter to employ its expertise in reviewing the condition of the insured's
business and maintaining coverage at a sufficient level. In undertaking to
render this service the broker became the insured's agent and relieved its
principal from the responsibility of effecting a minute examination of the
policies. At any rate, the discrepancy was not readily apparent and hence
not chargeable to the insured.
The court made several points which may help eliminate distortions in
liability principles brought about by myopic unitary characterizations of
intermediaries either as agents solely for the insured or as agents solely for
the insurer. First, the fact that an intermediary is licensed as an "agent"
or as a "broker" under the insurance code is irrelevant to a determination
of liability because the controlling issue is the particular contractual or
employment relationship between the parties and not the license held by
the intermediary. 2 Second, the fact that an intermediary has a pre-existing
relationship with insurers placing it in the position of an underwriting
3
agent for such insurers does not in and of itself prevent a dual agency. If
such intermediary undertakes to select a particular insurer, or a particular
coverage, or to render other services it becomes to this extent and in respect
to this phase of the transaction an agent for the insured.
II.

APPLICATION-MISREPRESENTATION

Material misrepresentations in any application for life insurance are
grounds for avoiding liability under the policy only if there is a showing
that the insurer has reasonably relied upon them.4 An insurer which issues
and delivers a policy after obtaining actual knowledge of an applicant's
poor health and physical condition can hardly claim to have been misled.
Recovery may thus be bottomed on the theory that the requisite element
of reliance is missing, or that issuance constitutes a waiver of the known
conditions. Interstate Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Merritt5 illustrates
that in order to invoke this principle a showing that the insurer had actual
knowledge of the condition misrepresented is not necessary. There need
only be a showing that the insurer had knowledge of facts reasonably
2.
3.
4.

Id. at 270, 210 S.E.2d at 803.
Id. at 270, 210 S.E.2d at 803.
See generally Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Perry, 121 Ga. App. 618, 174 S.E.2d

570 (1970).

5.

131 Ga. App. 825, 207 S.E.2d 231 (1974).
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putting it on notice that the condition misrepresented might actually exist.
In response to a question designed to elicit information on a list of specific
diseases and ailments, an applicant for an industrial life policy disclosed
that she had been suffering from arthritis and named the physician who
had treated her. In response to an inquiry by the insurer's medical director,
the physician in question disclosed that he had treated the applicant for
arthritis of the knees and hypertension. The insurer issued the policy and,
after the insured's death, declined to pay the claim on the ground that the
answers made in the application had not correctly reflected the state of her
health at that time since she had not revealed an advanced arteriosclerotic
condition which progressed until the time of her death. The court held that
the medical director of the insurer's underwriting department actually
knew that the applicant had been suffering from arthritis and hypertension, and as such, should have known that the applicant, shown on the
application to be 69 years of age, might well suffer from complications
attendant upon such ailments such as arteriosclerosis. Since the insurer
was thus fairly apprised of the state of the insured's health before issuance
of the policy, its decision to issue the policy anyway amounted to a waiver
of the very condition which it now seeks to assert as a defense.

III.

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND STATUTORY PENALTIES

Bleak developments under the code section on attorney's fees and statutory penalties' have inspired many a saturnine jeremiad in these pages.
The statute was described as a dead letter for practical purposes.7 While
not exactly an exercise in hyperbole, this characterization seems exaggerated when one uses the hindsight provided by recent cases. Thus in
Interstate Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Merritt' a statutory penalty
was assessed against an insurer which had issued industrial life insurance
policies with full knowledge of the state of the applicant's health and later,
upon the trial, sought to avoid liability by showing that the applicant had
made material misrepresentations regarding her medical history. The penalty was upheld because the insurer, having waived all known defenses
when it issued the policies, simply had no valid defense left to resist payment of the claim. A jury finding of bad faith was thus authorized. In
Interstate Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Hopgood the insurer, faced
with a claim under an accidental death policy, refused payment on the
grounds that no such policy ever existed. At the trial, its district manager
testified that there was no record of the policy and that no premiums had
ever been paid on such policy. It was not until after the beneficiary on
rebuttal produced the receipt book conclusively showing that premiums
6.
7.
8.
9.

GA. CODE ANN. § 56-1206 (Rev. 1971).
Pock, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Insurance, 25 MERCER L. REV. 151 (1973).
131 Ga. App. 825, 207 S.E.2d 231 (1974).
133 Ga. App. 6, 209 S.E.2d 703 (1974).
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had been paid on the policy that insurer's counsel by leave of court communicated with the home office, discovered that premiums had in fact
been paid, and stated so in open court. It was held that these facts provided a sufficient basis for the trial judge to find that the insurer had acted
in bad faith. The court reiterated the principle that only probable cause
for refusing payment will negative the imputation of bad faith, and that
without such probable cause refusal will be at the insurer's peril.
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Harris'° invites attention to certain inadequacies that inhere in the statute itself. Since liability for penalties and attorney's fees runs only to the "holder of the policy," insurers not constrained
to use good faith in paying or negotiating settlements with third party
beneficiaries, such as victims of automobile injuries who, having procured
a judgment against the policy holder, now have a direct cause of action
against the insurer. Since the statute seeks to curb chicanery, contumacy
and stubborn litigiousness by insurers which, almost by definition, have
more bargaining and staying power than their claimants, the statute
should be redrafted so as to encompass not only immediate parties to the
insurance contract, but also third party beneficiaries. This is particularly
justified in regard to automobile liability insurance where party autonomy
has been swept aside and third party rights have been mandated by statute.
IV.

CANCELLATION

Insurance premium finance agreements commit the insured to pay to the
premium finance company, usually, although not necessarily, a merchant
in consumer goods or a lending institution financing consumer purchases,
the amount advanced under the agreement to an insurer or insurance
broker in payment of premiums." The agreement routinely contains a
power of attorney enabling the premium finance company to cancel on
behalf of the insured any insurance contract listed in the agreement in case
the insured defaults on his payments. Since untimely cancellations, even
though induced by the insured's delinquencies, may have drastic consequences, the exercise of the power of attorney to cancel is closely policed
by legislation. The premium finance company is required to give to the
insured a 10 days notice in writing stating that it intends to cancel the
insurance contract unless the default is cured within such 10-day period.'"
10. 133 Ga. App. 567, 211 S.E.2d 783 (1974). It may be noted in passing that Georgia still
adheres to the notion that an insurer cannot be in bad faith if it defends on an issue which is
one of first impression in this state. See Aetna Fire Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Crawley, 132 Ga.
App. 181, 207 S.E.2d 666 (1974). Cases in other jurisdictions have occasionally held that an
insurer may be found to be acting in bad faith if it "runs" a test case at the expense of an
insured. If the insurer wants to settle a question to avoid future uncertainty it should arrange
for a "friendly" suit and pay the insured's litigation expenses. See, e.g., Seguin v. Continental
Serv. Life & Health Ins. Co., 230 La. 533, 89 So.2d 113 (1956).
11. GA. CODE ANN. §84-5303(b) (Rev. 1970).
12. GA. CODE ANN. §84-5312(b) (Rev. 1970).
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It is only after the expiration of such 10-day period that the company may
cancel the insurance in the name of the insured by mailing to the insurer
a notice of cancellation. Cancellation is then effected as though the insured
himself had submitted the notice of cancellation. 3
Garberv. American Mutual Fire Insurance Co.' 4 is a remainder that such
protective legislation has to be literally complied with. The insured had
defaulted on his installment payments due under a loan contract and the
premium finance company requested and obtained cancellation of the insured's automobile liability policy without complying with the 10-day notice period. It was held that the policy was not effectively cancelled. In
order to establish termination of the contract the insurer would have been
compelled to show (1) that it sent a cancellation notice of its own which
satisfied the general statutory requirements for cancellations initiated by
insurers'" or (2) that the premium finance company had sent a cancellation
notice to the insured and had otherwise complied with statutory formalities.' 6 This the insurer could not do.
The net effect of this decision is that insurers collaborating with premium finance companies assume the risk that these companies either inadvertently or deliberately fail to adhere to the statutory cancellation procedure and thus exceed their authority to represent the insured in requesting
cancellation. Since the statutory language is "read into" the power of
attorney and supersedes conflicting provisions therein, the insurer cannot
resort to such concepts as apparent authority or agency power to validate
cancellation of the policy.
V.

CONSTRUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

A.

"Automobile Business"

Standard liability policies exclude non-owned automobiles "while maintained or used by any person while such person is employed or otherwise
engaged in an automobile business." Such standard policies commonly
define automobile business as "the business or occupation of selling, leasing, repairing, servicing, storing or parking of automobiles." Is a man who
had been retired for about ten years from an automobile garage business
he had formerly owned but who occasionally worked on cars of his friends
in front of his house using equipment no more sophisticated than a little
hand tool box and charging very little for his labors, engaged in the business or occupation of repairing automobiles? State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Thigpen" held that he was not. In the ordinary accepted sense
working on fewer than one car per month hardly qualifies as a business,
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.

GA. CODE ANN. §84-5312(c) (Rev. 1970).

131 Ga. App. 366, 206 S.E.2d 86 (1974).
GA. CODE ANN. §56-2430.1 (Rev. 1971).
GA. CODE ANN. §84-5312 (REv. 1970).
131 Ga. App. 608, 206 S.E.2d 839 (1974).
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that is, as an undertaking engaged in with some regularity and for profit
and income, nor as an occupation, that is, as a vocation which principally
takes up one's time and implies an element of continuity or habitual practice.
B.

"Automobile" And "Farm Type Tractor Or Other Equipment"

Did a bathtub which had four wheels, a steering mechanism, a motor
and brakes and which was designed for an annual "bathtub race," a kind
of motorized soap box derby held on the campus of a college, qualify as
an "automobile" within the intendment of that term as used in standard
family automobile policies? Horne v. Government Employees Insurance
Co.",held that it did not. While the term automobile has a wide etymological range in that it covers all manner of self-propelled vehicles designed
primarily for use on highways and streets and capable of carrying passengers and loads, it does not connote all manner of motor vehicles. Its usual
and common signification would not, to name but one example, embrace
"motorcycle." While automobiles are necessarily motor vehicles, not all
motor-driven vehicles are necessarily automobiles.
Could coverage for this vehicular monstrosity be predicated on the language of a clause excluding injuries "while occupying or through being
struck by a farm type tractor or other equipment designed for use principally off public roads while not upon public roads"? Again the court concluded that it could not. The vehicle was admittedly designed solely for a
race to be held on an elliptical roadway within the confines of the controlled and guarded property of a college which was closed to ordinary
traffic on race days. If the contraption qualified as "other equipment," it
was designed "for use principally off public roads" and was involved in an
accident "while not upon public roads" and hence plainly within the compass of the exclusion. If, on the other hand, it is argued that the race track
was a "public road," then the vehicle was designed from the very beginning
for use on public roads and would thus fail to qualify as "equipment
designed for use principally off public roads" under the exclusionary
clause.
C.

"Loading And Unloading"

In Hodges Appliance Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 9 a
furniture company's truck had been insured as to certain hazards including damages incurred in "loading and unloading." It was alleged that the
insured's agents had unloaded an upholstered sofa from the truck into a
floor surface in the buyers' home while the latter were away and that the
sofa caught on fire which spread to and consumed other property in the
room and damaged the building. It was held that the complaint stated a
18.
19.

132 Ga. App. 230, 207 S.E.2d 636 (1974), petition for cert. filed.
133 Ga. App. 936, 213 S.E.2d 46 (1975), petition for cert. filed.
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cause of action. Notice pleading requires that whenever a motion to dismiss the complaint is made, the allegations in the complaint must be
construed most favorably towards the party opposing the motion. Hence
it had to be presumed that the floor furnace was lighted when the delivery
was made and the sofa began to burn immediately after being placed on
top of it. Absent a definition in the policy, it could not be said that "unloading" was completed until all of its phases were properly performed.
The sofa here was not completely "unloaded" until it was placed in a
location where it definitely and finally came to rest. Not necessarily the
location which the buyers' interior decorator might ultimately have had in
mind for it, but at least a location where it could have remained in relative
safety. The court indicated that no cause of action would have been stated
had the allegation disclosed that the fire had been the result of lighting
the floor furnace after the sofa had been placed on top of it. Damage would
thus not have been the product of "unloading" but of a supervening act of
negligence.
D.

"Motor Vehicle"

In Southern GuarantyInsuranceCo. v. Duncan" a youngster was injured
as a result of a piece of metal being projected into his eye because of the
alleged negligence of the homeowner while removing a steering wheel from
an automobile on the insured's premises. The automobile had been
adapted for use solely as a round track race car, had never been registered
as a motor vehicle after its adaptation, and had always been carried to the
various race tracks on a trailer. Was the automobile covered under a homeowner's policy which excluded coverage for any motor vehicles owned by
the insured? The policy defined motor vehicle as "a land motor vehicle,
trailer or semi-trailer designed for travel on public roads," but excluded
equipment designed for use principally off public roads, if not subject to
motor vehicle registration. (Emphasis added.) The court concluded that
it was covered. The race car was not subject to registration and was designed for use principally off public roads. It was therefore not a motor
vehicle within the sweep of the exclusion and thus as much within the
coverage as a defective lawn mower or a loose shingle on the roof.
E.

"Newly Acquired Automobile"

The standard "newly acquired automobile" clause is intended to meet
the desire for maintaining coverage whenever insured automobile owners
acquire other automobiles by way of replacement or addition during the
life of their policies. As soon as the insured acquires ownership of such
additional automobile his policy automatically extends coverage to it provided that the insured notifies his insurer within thirty days following the
date of delivery of the automobile. Georgia Mutual Insurance Co. v. Crite20.

131 Ga. App. 761, 206 S.E.2d 672 (1974).
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rion Insurance Co.' adopted the regnant interpretation of this automatic
coverage clause which characterizes the notice provision as a condition
subsequent that must be satisfied in order to maintain coverage beyond
the thirty-day period to the end of the policy term. Hence accidents occurring after the thirty-day period are covered only if the requisite notice was
given during the thirty-day period. Accidents occurring during the thirtyday period are automatically covered irrespective of whether notice of
acquisition is ever given. By the very terms of the policy it is the acquisition and not the notice of acquisition which affords an automatic and
immediate extension of coverage for a thirty-day period. A failure to notify
the insurer within this period terminates coverage as to future accidents
but does not cut off liabilities incurred while coverage was in force.
F.

"Temporary Substitute Automobile"

Standard automobile liability policies cover not only the described vehicle but also a temporary substitute automobile defined as "an automobile
not owned by the named insured or his spouse if a resident of the same
household, while temporarily used as a substitute for the described automobile when withdrawn from normal use because of its breakdown, repair,
servicing loss or destruction." Fulcher v. Canal Insurance Co.22 held that
a motor vehicle need not be a private passenger automobile to meet the
policy definition of a temporary substitute vehicle; its use must not only
be temporary but must also substitute for a described vehicle while such
vehicle is immobilized or otherwise unavailable because of the listed conditions. A non-owned 1964 Ford truck which was often operated in the business of the insured and was customarily used to haul various appliances
could hardly be said to have been but "temporarily" used nor, in the
absence of a design or attempt to use the described and insured dump
trucks, could it be said to have been used as a "substitute" for any of them.
This is not to say, however, that an ordinary truck could not substitute for
a dump truck or a passenger vehicle in an appropriate case.
VI.

COOPERATION CLAUSES

Liability policies contain as an important component of their cooperation provisions a clause which, making allowances for minor variations in
language, requires that if a claim is made or a suit is brought against the
insured, the insured shall immediately forward to the company every demand, notice, summons or other process received by him or his representative. In Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. J.B. Forrest& Sons, Inc. 13 a suit was
21. 131 Ga. App. 339, 206 S.E.2d 88 (1974), petition for cert. filed.
22. 132 Ga. App. 325, 208 S.E.2d 116 (1974), petition for cert. filed.
23. 133 Ga. App. 864, 212 S.E.2d 497 (1975). This case, having first appeared at 132 Ga.
App. 714, 209 S.E.2d 6 (1974), was remanded to the trial court, sitting without a jury, for
additional findings of fact.
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filed against the insured on August 21, 1973 but the summons were not
forwarded to the insurer until January 11, 1974. The trial court held that
the forwarding was timely in that the delay was due to the stay in bankruptcy granted as a result of a bankruptcy petition filed against the insured
on August 22, 1973. The stay in bankruptcy prohibited any further action
in the tort suit filed on the previous day and thus prevented any change
in its status. It was held that the delay was unjustified as a matter of law.
The stay in bankruptcy which kept the prior tort action in a state of
suspended animation may well show that the insurer was not prejudiced
by the delay. However, absence of prejudice is irrelevant where the policy
casts its cooperation clauses in the form of express conditions precedent
rather than in the form of promises by using language such as "no action
shall lie against the company unless, as a condition precedent thereto,
there shall have been full compliance with all of the terms of this policy."
The court conceded that the term "immediately" has not been given its
literal meaning. Cases have found that forwarding was timely because the
delay was justified by lack of knowledge by the insured, 4 or because the
insured had suffered some incapacitating injury25 or because of waiver
conduct by the insurer. 26 "Immediately" has thus been construed to mean
with reasonable diligence and within a reasonable length of time in view
of attending circumstances of each particular case. Here, however, the
obligation to notify the insurer existed quite independently of pending
bankruptcy proceedings. Furthermore, the fact that a bankruptcy petition
was filed against the insured did not in any way prevent him or his attorney
from forwarding the suit papers to the insurer or affect his capacity to do
SO.
Another perhaps even more important component of the cooperation
"package" is the requirement that in case of an accident written notice
shall be given by or on behalf of the insured to the company or any of its
authorized agents as soon as practicable. Georgia Mutual Insurance Co. v.
CriterionInsurance Co. 7 illustrates that the term "practicable" is at least
as flexible as the term "immediately" employed in other parts of the policy. The insureds had bought a Mustang automobile for use of their minor
son which was involved in a collision soon after the purchase. The record
disclosed that they failed to notify their liability carrier for nearly four
months because they were ignorant of the fact that their policy automatically extended coverage to the Mustang as an additional automobile.
When investigators for another insurer intimated to them that they might
be covered under their own policy they promptly notified their insurer. It
was held that this raised a material issue of fact and that the triers of fact
24. See, e.g., Hulme v. Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Assoc., 60 Ga. App. 65, 2 S.E.2d
750 (1939).
25. See, e.g., Carruth v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 157 Ga. 608, 122 S.E. 226 (1924).
26. See, e.g., Cooper v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 93 Ga. App. 127, 91 S.E.2d 120 (1955).
27. 131 Ga. App. 339, 206 S.E.2d 88 (1974), petition for cert. filed.
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might find that notification was made as soon as practicable. Hence the
insurer was not entitled to a summary judgment.
VII.

COVERAGE-EXCEPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS

In PrudentialInsurance Co. of America v. Howell the supreme court
confirmed the old adage, apodictically asserted in many a decision,2 that
insurance is a matter of contract, not sympathy. Airman Howe, a radar
technician aboard a U.S. Air Force plane, died of asphyxia due to drowning
and overexposure about seven hours after his plane had made an emergency landing in the Atlantic Ocean which had resulted in injuries to his
leg and a slight bruise to his forehead. His life insurance policy excluded
double indemnity coverage for death resulting "from travel or flight in or
descent from any kind of aircraft, except as a passenger with no duties
whatsoever aboard such aircraft while in flight." The court of appeals had
held earlier that the exclusionary clause was inapplicable since death had
legally resulted from drowning and not from the preceding crash.30 While
the decision was based on the erroneous assumption of fact that the insured had left the airplane without suffering any injury and that he was
in at least potential safety floating in his partially inflated life vest, there
was language in the opinion indicating that the ruling would have been the
same even if injuries had resulted from the crash itself because the lapse
of several hours between the crash and the drowing broke the chain of
causation and thus made the crash too remote to qualify as an efficient and
proximate cause of death.
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and held that the crash
of the airplane was the legal cause of the insured's death. To pretend that
death, under the circumstances of the case, came from accidental drowning, would amount to a violent fiction which completely ignores the plain
meaning of the word "resulting." On a parity of reasoning the supreme
court also stated emphatically that whenever injuries are sustained in the
crash it could not be held as a matter of law that the passage of time alone,
however extended, would break the chain of causation between the crash
and the ensuing death by drowning.
Aetna Fire Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Crawley3 is a case of first
impression in this state. The insured's home had sustained water damage
as a result of a peculiar concatenation of circumstances. When a contractor
built a house uphill from the insured's home and made an excavation in
order to tap on the sewage system of the new house to the main county
sewer line, the excavation filled with water from surface drainage during
28. 232 Ga. 1, 205 S.E.2d 263 (1974).
29. See, e.g., Sloan v. Continental Cas. Co., 131 Ga. App. 377, 378, 205 S.E.2d 925, 926
(1974).
30. Howe v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 130 Ga. App. 107, 202 S.E.2d 669 (1973). See
also Pock, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Insurance, 26 MERCER L. REv. 109, 118 (.1974).
31. 132 Ga. App. 181, 207 S.E.2d 666 (1974).
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a period of heavy rainfall. This water found its way into a nearby tap on
the sewer line left open for future connection, creating tremendous pressure, and on reaching the lowest level at the insured's home entered
through his appliance connections, at times shooting up some three feet
into the air and causing considerable damage. The insured's homeowner's
policy covered among the perils insured against "accidental discharge or
overflow of water. . . from within a plumbing. . . system or from within
a domestic appliance" but excepted losses "caused by, resulting from,
contributed to or aggravated by . . . surface water. . . water which backs
up through sewers or drains . . . water below the surface of the ground
including that which exerts pressure on or flows, seeps or leaks through
sidewalks, driveways, foundations, walls or floors." 3
The court held that the damage was covered because the discharge of
water from the insured's plumbing and appliance systems was not the
result of any of the excepted causes. In order to reach this conclusion the
court had to make three determinations: First, that the term "surface
water" denotes only water flowing on the surface of the ground at the time
it enters the home of the insured; Second, that the water did not back up
from the insured's sewers and drains. Instead, it entered after collecting
in an area remote from his premises and over which he had no control. This
is to be contrasted with a situation where an immediate drain pipe is
clogged by grease so that water backs up because it cannot be properly
carried away. In such situation the exception would apply. Thirdly, the
court had to determine that the water, although below the surface, did not
flow or leak through the insured's sidewalks, foundations or walls but
entered through a specific sewer pipe.
In Tugalo Development Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America" the
insurer managed to avoid liability by falling back on the convolutions of a
particularly poorly drafted exclusion. The insured marina owner leased a
tractor-trailer and hired a driver to transport a houseboat to a boat show
for display and sale. There was a collision in transit allegedly caused by
the negligence of the driver which resulted in injuries to third parties. The
policy provided protection for loss from property damage to insured boats,
including the houseboat in question, which were owned or offered for sale
by the marina. The policy also provided liability coverage for property
damage and personal injury "if the assured shall by reason of his interest
in any boat insured . . . become liable to pay . . . any. . . damages" but
excluded "any liability incurred by the insured boat while it is ashore.'''
(Can a boat incur liability?) The court held that the insured's liability did
not arise "by reason of his interest in any boat" but because of vicarious
liability for its servant's negligent operation of the tractor-trailer. Moreover, the liability plainly covered only boats afloat and not boats while in
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 182, 207 S.E.2d at 667-68 (emphasis added).
132 Ga. App. 495, 208 S.E.2d 502 (1974).
Id. at 497, 208 S.E.2d at 504-05.
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transit ashore.
Health insurers naturally want to protect themselves against adverse
selection and to avoid covering persons who seek to shift their medical
expenses to insurers by buying policies on the advent of their hospitalization. One typical method for achieving this end is by a policy provision
excluding coverage for charges for sickness, disease, or bodily injury which
required medical care or treatment during the three months immediately
preceding the effective date of the insurance. Mutual Life Insurance Co.
of New York v. Bishop" seems to limit the effectiveness of this exclusion
at least as presently worded. The insured was covered under an employees
group hospitalization insurance policy effective June 24, 1972. His wife,
covered under the policy as a member of his family, was hospitalized only
two days later for the removal of a cyst which later turned out to be a 22
pound ovarian tumor. During a routine physical examination prior thereto,
on June 6, 1972, her physician found that her stomach was extended and
suspected that this was due to one of two pathological causes. He told her
to come in for testing on June 20, 1972. She underwent various tests on that
date as a result of which a decision to operate was made. 6 Did the examination on June 6 and the tests administered on June 20 constitute "medical care or treatment" within three months of the inception date so as to
exclude coverage? The court held that it did not, explaining that "medical
care or treatment" referred to something done in the application of the
curative arts, whether by drugs or other therapy, with the end in view of
alleviating a pathological condition. 7 Preoperative visits for diagnostic and
evaluation purposes did not fall into this category.
Whatever the salubrious effects of this decision upon insurance consumers who, after all, expect their coverage to commence on the effective day
of the policy, its reasoning appears subject to serious objections. Given
the fact that one is dealing not with coverage but with an exclusion from
coverage, one may well agree that the phrase "medical care or treatment"
should receive a narrow interpretation and not be extended to its maximum etymological range which would encompass all of the things performed by a physician on the body of the patient in the preparation for
cure. Yet, how does one get around the import of the word "require" which
was completely ignored by the majority opinion? Can one say that someone
suffering from a malady who postpones appropriate treatment thereby
proves that no treatment is "required"? If the insured actually suffers from
a described disease and his condition indicates to him that medical attention is appropriate or needed if he is to have relief from his disease, then
35. 132 Ga. App. 816, 209 S.E.2d 223 (1974), petition for cert. filed.
36. It should be noted that the policy involved in this case was not purchased with a view
to having an insurer pay for a specific (and nearly certain) medical expense. The insured's
husband had become a participant in a group plan by virtue of his employment.
37. 132 Ga. App. at 818, 209 S.E.2d at 225.
38. See Justice Eberhardt's trenchant dissent, 132 Ga. App. at 819, 209 S.E.2d at 226.
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surely "medical care or treatment" can be said to be "required" although
it may not be technically dispensed to him at that time.
Regulatory statutes which compel certain coverages or require that the
insurer include in its contracts provisions at least as favorable as the statutory model obviously supersede conflicting policy provisions; they are simply "read" into the policy. It is equally obvious that not all statutes regulating insurance effect policy content and party autonomy. Thus the Motor
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act requires the depositing of security as
proof of ability to respond in damages for liability by the operator or owner
of a motor vehicle involved in an accident so that the owner or operator
will not have his driver's license and registration certificate suspended.' 9
One of the exceptions to this requirement is when the owner or operator
"had in effect at the time of such accident an automobile liability policy
with respect to the motor vehicle involved in such accident." 0 This exception also provides with reference to liability insurance that the policy must
provide coverage in certain minimum amounts. Fitzgerald v. Universal
UnderwritersInsurance Co." held that the act does not require total coverage for any damages for which the insured might become liable. Its effect
is simply that if an individual's liability policy does cover his potential
liability to "any person aggrieved after an accident" he does not have to
post any security. It is only if he has no insurance at all, or if his policy
does not cover the particularclaim in question that he must prove financial
responsibility. Hence an insurer under a motorcycle liability policy may
freely exclude from coverage injuries to passengers of the vehicle. If an
accident results in a liability claim by a passenger the act compels posting
of security because the insured does not have the type of coverage which
relieves him from this requirement. The statute regulates the activities of
the insured and not those of the insurer and is not a mandate as to policy
content.

VIII.

DEATH

By ACCIDENTAL

MEANS

"Double indemnity" benefits under life insurance policies and simple
benefits under accident policies are recoverable only if death was caused
solely by external, violent, and accidental means which arose solely and
independently of other causes. Literally construed, this clause would mean
that sudden death, although in and of itself viewed as an accident, is not
covered unless it in turn is caused by an accident not contributed to by a
preexisting infirmity or by other nonaccidental causes; in other words, the
accident must be caused by an accident. It can easily be seen why this
refined product of the draftsman's art has been described as the most
litigation-prone language found in insurance contracts." One wonders if
39.
40.
41.
42.

GA. CODE ANN. §92A-605(a) (Rev. 1972).
GA. CODE ANN. §92A-605(c) (Rev. 1972).
132 Ga. App. 610, 208 S.E.2d 619 (1974).
E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 243 (2d ed. 1957).
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this and cognate linguistic ventures are not infelicitous instances in which
the legal profession has overserviced its clients. By drafting up to the edge
of the possible and conscionable without leaving themselves a reasonable
margin of safety, lawyers may have invited judicial nullification of their
endeavors and spawned rules of misconstruction which ignore language
and intent in order to give the consumer a "break." Georgia decisions have
not followed the growing trend 3 allowing recovery under this clause for all
forms of sudden death even if produced by an intended act or nonaccidental cause just so long as the particular manner in which death occurred can
be said to be an "accident" in common parlance. Nor have Georgia decisions followed the "strict constructionist" view of the clause, although they
can be said to hover fairly close to it. In Life Insurance Co. of Georgia v.
Thomas" the insured was shown to have died from aspiration of food
material, both digested and undigested, which had been regurgitated, clogging the windpipe causing asphyxiation. Although there was evidence that
the insured might have died of natural causes or that death might have
resulted from a malfunctioning of his epiglottis allowing him to draw the
regurgitated food into his windpipe, a condition which might have been
caused by his admittedly poor health, there was also evidence in the record
allowing the jury to find that death was proximately caused by a sudden
and accidental clogging of the windpipe by a foreign body (undigested
food) which had not yet become a body fluid through natural digestive
processes. This shows that conflicting expert evidence in the record may
well save the day for beneficiaries even where juries are enjoined to subsume their findings under instructions hewing close to the "strict constructionist" point of view.
Also important, although occasionally overlooked, is the particular stage
in the proceedings when the issue of coverage is raised and the particular
procedural device that is employed to raise it. Thus in Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Holcombe45 the insured died nine days after an automobile accident
in which she was thrown into the steering column of her car when the
steering wheel came off. The car crashed into a curb and went down a
ravine. The insured complained that her stomach was hurt, went immediately home to bed, but refused medical ministrations or hospitalization
saying, "No, I'm going to-I'm going to die right here." 4' The next night
her abdomen was considerably swollen. Eight days after the accident she
started hemorrhaging severely and had to be taken to a hospital by ambulance. She died there a day later. The insurer moved for a summary judgment, largely based on a deposition taken from the family physician who
had signed the death certificate ascribing death to an infarction of the
43. See, e.g., Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n of America, 295 N.Y.
294, 67 N.E.2d 248 (1946).
44. 133 Ga. App. 134, 210 S.E.2d 250 (1974).
45. 132 Ga. App. 111, 207 S.E.2d 537 (1974), petition for cert. filed.
46. Id. at 112, 207 S.E.2d at 538.
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small bowel and who had been familiar with the insured's condition for
several years. Expertly calibrated questions finally led the physician to
depose that death could have either been caused by severe arteriosclerosis
from which the insured had been suffering for several years or from the
impact with the steering column and that the chances were about "equal."
Again the day was at least temporarily saved for the beneficiary when the
court held that on a motion for summary judgment the burden was on the
insurer to prove the negative, and to prove it by evidence that demands a
finding in favor of the insurer. Since the evidence adduced did not show
conclusively and as a matter of law that the infarction of the lower bowel
of the deceased was not directly and independently of all other causes the
result of the accidental injury received in the automobile a few days before
her death, the insurer's motion for a summary judgment was overruled.
Cases of this kind may, of course, be a pyrrhic victory for the insured
because upon the trial the evidence will have to preponderate in favor of
the insured. "Iffy" testimony by the physician, which may cause the insurer to lose out during the summary judgment phase, may well lead either
to a directed verdict or to a jury verdict in its favor.
Another asphyxiation case, Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v.
Morris,47 involved a man hired to help run a moonshine liquor still who
died the first day on his new job from aspiration caused by regurgitation
of coffee-like grounds. The court clarified two points. First, that death can
be classified as resulting from external means even though the foreign
matter which becomes lodged in the windpipe after regurgitation emanates
from inside the body. The court rejected as spurious the distinction made
by some decisions which maintain that a seed from a ripe plum that
becomes lodged in the windplpe on its way down and produces anoxia is
an external means while a seed that is swallowed, goes into the stomach,
and produces anoxia when accidentally regurgitated is not an external
means because the seed is expelled from inside the body. Second, that the
exception excluding from coverage death resulting from the insured's participating in an assault or felony becomes operative only upon proof of a
causal connection between the felonious activity and death.

IX.

LIMITATION IN POLICY-TIME FOR SUIT

Blanket accident and sickness policies "issued or delivered in this State"
are required to contain certain provisions which are at least as favorable
to policyholders as the standard provisions mandated by statute." The
standard provision covering the "private" statute of limitations in policies
compels insurers to offer as a minimum a clause stating that "no such
action [on the policy] shall be brought after the expiration of three years
47.
48.

132 Ga. App. 631, 208 S.E.2d 637 (1974).
GA. CODE ANN. §56-3105 (Rev. 1971).
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after the time written proof of loss is required to be furnished." 49 Sloan v.
Continental Casualty Co."0 held that this regulatory scheme is not applicable to a policy that is solicited, written, and delivered outside of this state
and does not expressly contemplate coverage of the insured in this state
when written. Hence a one year contractual limitation contained in such
a policy will be given effect in this state if its incorporation is valid under
the relevant law of the contract. This conclusion is not only predicated
upon the specific statute itself5' but also upon the general conflict of laws
principle injected into the Georgia Insurance Code.5"

X.

OTHER INSURANCE CLAUSES-PRIMARY AND EXCESS INSURANCE

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Holton5 again serves notice upon
insurers that their ingenious attempts to sidestep the effect of pro rata
liability clauses by drafting sublime "excess" and "escape" clauses may
easily come to naught where two policies are present upon the same risk
and both posture as excess insurance which becomes available only after
the "other" policy is exhausted or which provide no coverage at all just
because the "other" policy exists.
Mechanical decision formulas which designate one policy as "primary"
and the other as "excess" on the basis of which policy was issued first or
the directness of the primary tortfeasor's relationship to a particular insurer are obviously arbitrary and often simply unworkable." It is better to
recognize the situation for what it is-an irreconcilable conflict which is
best resolved by ignoring the conflicting provisions and compelling the
insurers to prorate. This is particularly the case when both excess provisions are highly specific and practically identical. Thus in Holton the
tortfeasor was covered by his own homeowner's policy while operating a
non-owned motor boat and was also covered as a permittee under the
omnibus clause of the boatowner's policy. Both policies provided that
under such circumstances they would only apply as excess insurance over
the "other" insurance without regard to whether the insured was named
or unnamed, or whether the watercraft was owned or non-owned. The court
had no difficulty finding the provisions to be antithetical and disregarded
them. It must be noted, however, that this decision leaves intact earlier
holdings involving the usual conflict between the owner's policy on a vehicle which covers the operator as an additional insured during permissive
use, and the operator's policy which covers him while using a non-owned
49.
50.
51.
52.

GA. CODE ANN. §56-3105(7) (Rev. 1971).

131 Ga. App. 377, 205 S.E.2d 925 (1974).
GA. CODE ANN. §56-3105 (Rev. 1971).
GA. CODE ANN. §56-302(4) (Rev. 1971).

53. 131 Ga. App. 247, 205 S.E.2d 872 (1974), petition for cert. filed.
54. For discussion of these approaches see Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 444 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. 1969).
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vehicle.55 In such cases both policies usually provide for pro rata coverage
under certain circumstances but extend excess coverage only in the event
of user of a non-owned vehicle and the rule is that the owner's policy is
charged with primary liability up to its policy limits, and the permittee's
policy is liable only for excess coverage up to the amount of the judgment
or its policy limit.56

XI.

UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

Wages v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.57 addresses an
issue of first impression in this state-whether an insured co-defendant
with sufficient liability insurance to satisfy judgments rendered in favor
of the plaintiff jointly and severally against said insured co-defendant and
an uninsured defendant, is entitled to contribution from the plaintiffs
uninsured motorist carrier. The court held that the public policy of this
state in enacting the uninsured motorist statute" was to afford the public
generally with the same protection in the form of a minimum uninsured
motorist coverage that it would have had if the uninsured motorist had
carried the same amount of coverage in the form of an automobile liability
policy issued in his name. As such it followed that an insurer of a codefendant in an automobile negligence suit has a right to seek pro rata
contribution from the plaintiff's liability insurer which provides uninsured
motorist coverage in regard to an uninsured co-defendant. Contribution is
thus as readily available as it would be if the "uninsured" co-defendant
had in fact carried a liability policy containing the same limits as the
uninsured motorist rider. Any other interpretation would in effect allow
the uninsured motorist insurance carrier to limit the applicability of the
uninsured motorist coverage to a sum which is in excess of other insurance
coverage. Such position is untenable in light of Travelers Indemnity Co.
v. Williams,59 which held that insurers could not evade the statutory mandate"6 to pay the insured "all sums which he shall be legally entitled to
recover as damages from the owner or operator of an insured motor vehicle" by the subterfuge of an excess or an escape clause.6
2
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Jones"
involved a more
direct attempt to avoid the reach of Travelers Indemnity. The insurer had
55.

See, e.g., Chicago Ins. Co. v. American S. Ins. Co., 115 Ga. App. 799, 156 S.E.2d 143

(1967).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
sured
62.

See, e.g., 115 Ga. App. at 802, 156 S.E.2d at 146.
132 Ga. App. 79, 208 S.E.2d 1 (1974).
GA. CODE ANN. §56-407.1 (Rev. 1971).
119 Ga. App. 414, 167 S.E.2d 174 (1969), petition for cert. denied.
GA. CODE ANN. §56-407.1 (Rev. 1971).
119 Ga. App. 414, 167 S.E.2d 174 (1969). Note that State Farm defended the uninmotorist but was not a party to the action as such.
133 Ga. App. 920, 213 S.E.2d 73 (1975).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

built an elaborate excess clause into its uninsured motorist rider. It conceded that the excess clause would be void as to persons coming within the
definition of "insured" as contained in the uninsured motorist statute. 3 At
the same time it contended ingeniously that the excess clause was valid
as to a person who, although actually an "insured" because of a sweeping
omnibus clause in the policy,64 did not meet the more narrow definition of
"insured" contained in the statute. The court held that since the policy
did not differentiate between different classes of insureds in its escape
clause, the word "insured" in that provision applied across the board to
all insureds, including those within protection of the uninsured motorist
statute. The escape clause was therefore in conflict with the statute and
on its face void.
The court indicated, however, that the result might be different if the
insurer had drafted its escape clause so narrowly as only to encompass only
persons falling outside the definition of "insured" contained in the uninsured motorist statute. This may well prompt another trip to the drawing
boards!

XI.

STATUTES

As suggested at the outset, the most significant piece of insurance legislation emerging from the 1975 session of the General Assembly is the act
authorizing prepaid legal services plans.6 5 While too detailed for minute
expatiation in the context of this survey, the salient features can be
summed up as follows: First, the commissioner of insurance may license
any person, group, fraternal or benevolent organization, including but not
limited to insurers, corporations, partnerships, trusts, labor, craft or other
unions to "sponsor" (i.e., establish or operate) a prepaid legal services
plan in accordance with specified guidelines.
Second, licensed "sponsors" may enter into "subscription contracts"
with individuals, their employers, or with representatives of groups for
periods not exceeding one year. These contracts provide for rendition or
payment of certain legal services and must adhere to a prescribed statutory
model and be approved by the commissioner.67
GA. CODE ANN. §56-407.1(b) (Rev. 1971), which states:
[T]he term "insured" means the named insured and, while resident of the same
household, the spouse of any such named insured, and relatives of either. . . and
any person who uses, with the consent of. . . the named insured, the motor vehicle
. . . and a guest in such motor vehicle. ...
64. The contract defined "insured" as "any person occupying an automobile not owned
by the named insured while being operated by the named insured." 133 Ga. App. at 920, 213
S.E.2d at 73.
65. Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 1268.
66. Id. at 1270-72.
67. Id. at 1274-76.
63.
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Third, licensed "sponsors" may reinsure themselves by contracting with
casualty insurance companies authorized to do business in this state to
indemnify their subscribers in case their prepaid legal services plans fail
to meet their obligations to provide or pay for the attorney's fees and court
costs covered by the subscription contract."
Fourth, the commissioner of insurance is given extensive visitorial and
monitoring powers.Underwriting rules and schedules for rates, premiums
or membership fees charged to subscribers are subject to his approval.
"Sponsors" are required to file comprehensive annual statistical reports
which will generate actuarial and other information helpful in shaping the
configuration of prepaid schemes in years to come. 9
Fifth, parameters for advertising and solicitation for prepaid legal services plans are carefully defined and the code's prohibitions of unfair trade
practices are extended to "sponsors." 7
Georgia's foray into the terra incognita of no-fault insurance, the Motor
Vehicle Accident Reparations Act enacted only in 1974, 71became the subject of three amendments. First, optional coverages were somewhat increased, new definitions added, and present definitions refined." Second,
named insureds who have not previously responded to an offer to accept
or reject the optional coverages required by the Act must be given another
opportunity to do so." Third, insurers cancelling the minimimum insurance mandated by the Act are now required to notify the Department of
Public Safety allowing it to initiate proper action in regard to obtaining
proof of other insurance from the owner or effecting seizure of his operator's
license and vehicle license tags.7"
FAIR (Fair Access to Insurance Requirements) Plans, the outgrowth of
those frightful years when urban riots were threatening to become part of
our daily routine, have been resuscitated.75 These plans are designed to
make essential property insurance available to all qualified applicants by
requiring property insurers, as a condition of their authority to transact
property insurance in this state, to become and remain members of underwriting associations which, subject to the approval of the commissioner,
formulate and administer FAIR plans. The plans require that all member
insurers participate proportionately in the underwriting, expenses, profits
and losses. On meeting certainstandards, FAIR plans make member insurers eligible for federal reinsurance.
The statute compelling insurers to give written notice of cancellation has
been amended to allow policyholders more time to secure coverage from
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 1276-77.
Id.at 1277, 1281-84.
Id.at 1278-79.
GA. CODE ANN., ch. 26-34B (Supp. 1974).
Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 1202.
Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 3.
Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 516.
Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 22.
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other insurers."6 If a policy has been in effect for at least 60 days and is
cancelled for reasons other than failure to pay premiums, ordinary insurance consumers are now entitled to a 30-day notice. Holders of property
and casualty policies on industrial or commercial concerns are entitled to
a 15-day notice.
The Uninsured Motorist Statute was amended to provide a long-needed
venue provision for "John Doe" actions.77 When action is instituted against
an unknown defendant as "John Doe," the residence of such defendant
shall be presumed to be in the county in which the accident causing injury
or damages occurred, or in the county of residence of the plaintiff, at the
election of the plaintiff in the action.
Other enactments during the current survey period are of a technical or
administrative character. They include an amendment of the Premium
Finance Company Act," the delineation standards for insurance holding
company systems, 79 the imposition of mandatory agreements for apportionment of certain casualty insurance, s° and the vesting of added powers
in the office of commissioner of insurance, such as the power to license
nonresident adjusters8 ' and to put insurers and their agents on probation
82
and to impose monetary penalties.
76.
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